Duped Diplomats of India

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has let down the country umpteen times.  Somehow, since our independence, it has not been able to get its act together.  Repeated failures in the formulation of policy and an absolute lack of strategic thinking have been their hallmark.  In the past two decades, they have been joined by National Security Council.  Now, both are bungling together with no idea as to how to pursue our national interest and have collectively resolved to play blind and not see   the writings on the wall.

J&K

After centuries of slavery, we became independent but we still lacked the basic strategic sense to consolidate our borders with neighboring countries.  First, it was Pakistan that attacked the then independent state of J&K.  After the Sovereign of the State signed the instrument of accession, acceding the state to India on 26 Oct 1947, there was no legal doubt as to our sovereign jurisdiction over the state.  A naïve Nehru was manipulated by Mount Batten to call for a ceasefire and complain to the UNO of the armed aggression by Pakistan: Our MEA complained under Chapter VI; Pacific Settlement of Disputes of the UN Charter.  We ought to have complained under ‘Chapter VII; Actions with Respect to Acts of Aggression’ where the UN has the right to remove the aggression by the use of force under Article 42.  Thus, our MEA, even after the status of J&K was legally unambiguous still, we ourselves called it a disputed territory making “Pakistan a Legal Disputant”.  The festering wound has remained till today.  Who was responsible for this grave lapse?

Tibet

We allowed China to annex the Independent Nation of Tibet and other than a mild protest did nothing to prevent it.  Rather we came to the help of China by negating a discussion on the ‘Invasion of Tibet’ sponsored by El Salvador in UNGA in Dec 1950.  We really did not know; what we wanted?  Thereafter on 29 Apr 1954, we signed a Protocol on Trade and Intercourse; and accepted Tibet as a part of China.  We could have accepted it under a proviso that the current Indo-Tibetan Borders would be Sino-Indian Borders; giving China no opportunity to raise future disputes on our borders.  We did not do so and converted a peaceful and stable Indo-Tibetan Borders into a ‘Hostile and Unstable Sino Indian Border’.  In the bargain, we also lost on the buffer state of Tibet.  Can any Indian pardon the anti-national omission by the MEA?

Aksai Chen

To further compound the confusion, we did not bother to reach out to our neighbours on our borders.  We on our own assumed that Johnson’s Line in J&K and Mc Mohon Line in the Eastern Sector as our borders.  In Aug 1958, an Indian Patrol that had gone into Aksai Chen did not return.  On 18 Oct 1958, our Foreign Secretary sent an informal note to the Chinese Ambassador to India stating that the Tibet – Xinjiang Highway was going through our territory.  The Note also adduced proof to our claim and referred to The Treaty of Chushul of 1842. It also stated that one of our patrols that had gone to the area has not returned.  Imagine we took two years to protest as the Highway was constructed between 1954-56, that too, in an informal note to the Chinese Ambassador.  Look at the casual and lackadaisical attitude of our MEA on this vital issue?  The Chinese embassy responded on 3 Nov 1958 that the said patrol had entered the Chinese territory and has been detained by our Frontier Guard and would be deported.  The note did not elaborate or give any evidence or proof regarding the ownership of the area. Instead of claiming the area, we rubbed salt on our own wounds.  On 8 Nov 1958, the MEA sent another note verbal to the Chinese Foreign Office stating; “The question whether the particular area is Indian or Chinese territory is a matter of dispute, which has to be dealt separately.”  Just look at the naivety of our MEA that we ourselves are calling the area disputed.  When we have our claim lines right up to Johnson’s Line that lies on the Eastern Edge of Aksai Chen; why call this area disputed instead of outrightly claiming it?  The Chinese were very clear; on 23 Jan 1959, Zhou in his letter to Nehru claimed the entire area based on ‘Concept of Jurisdiction’.  He notes that the area had always been under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and reiterated that the road in question was constructed in 1956.  It was further reiterated in further correspondence that India let alone raising objection did not even know of the road under construction.  Therefore, the area had always been under the jurisdiction of China and has been continuously patrolled by Chinese troops.

Now the question is; who drafted and approved this sordid note dated 8 Nov 1958, casting doubts on our own claims? MEA, any takers?  Will you sack someone for this lapse.  I have no doubts the person whoever it was, who had approved it, must have retired and taken all his monetary dues and probably is no more now?  What about the damage caused to our country?  Why don’t we have an ‘Accountability Commission to drag all government servants including ministers who have caused irreparable damage to the nation?  One cannot hide behind the concept that we took the decision based on the inputs which were then available.  To this day, no officials from the MEA have ever reconnoitered our borders but are ever willing to make a decision, as a matter of routine; however, they compensate their inadequacy in knowledge by wearing a facade of a polymath.

Shimla Agreement -1972

Just, recount the Shimla Agreement of 1972; a victorious nation returns over 93,000 prisoners of war with absolutely not an iota of strategic returns.  In the follow-up Delhi Agreement of 1973 signed by the Foreign Ministers of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; it was Pakistan a defeated nation that was calling the shots on repatriation. India also favoured repatriating all Prisoners of War including those who were involved in war crimes and genocide in Bangladesh.  Add to the incongruity, India did not ensure that all Indian Prisoners of War were repatriated.  To this day there are about 54 Indian PsOW languishing in Pakistani jails.  Such are the ways of our MEA; absolutely meticulous in repatriating Pakistani PsOW including the war criminals; however, not interested in tracing out our own PsOW.

Foolishness in Kargil

Again, in Kargil; a most foolish order was given by PM, Vajpayee not to cross the LOC but to evict the Pakistani Army that had crossed the LOC and occupied strategic heights, and interdicted our vital national highway.  In the very foolishness of the stipulation; I see the stamp of our MEA and the hubris of the then NSA.    Even the Indian Airforce was told not to cross the LAC.  Obviously, it entailed attacks from the most expected direction on steep mountains where the enemy had all the resources to concentrate his deployment and firepower.  We lost over five hundred officers and men killed and over 1300 wounded.  Who is responsible for giving such insane advice? Have they been punished?

Surrender at Kandahar: Flight No: IC-814

Again, never will our country pardon Vajpayee for showing India as a soft state by surrendering Masood Azhar and two terrorists to set free Indian Airlines Flight No IC-814 with 160 people on board.  Of the released terrorists, Masood Azhar went on to mastermind the Parliamentary attack and later Pathankot Airfield attack. Omar Sheikh murdered Daniel Pearl and was involved in the 9/11 attacks.  Which moron advised Vajpayee? Please own up.  If such a person is alive; he should also take the blame and should be called to repent and brought before the Accountability Commission. Easy to counter me that soldiers do not understand the nuances of governance; sorry, I will not let you hide behind such absurdities: You have failed our country and have shown it as a soft and failed state.  India became an easy target for terrorists and the Parliamentary attack vindicates the asininity of the decision.

Ambiguity of LAC

In 1993, India and China after a thaw in relations signed ‘The Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity on the LAC’.  The dopes who accompanied PM, Narasimha Rao vetted the Agreement; not one, bothered to find out which is the LAC that is being referred to?  Where does it lie geographically?  So, we sign that there should be peace in such and such area without ever defining which is that area? Our MEA personnel would have nodded their heads like pageant rams in a village fair.  Similarly, a series of Agreements on CBMs on LAC is signed; which is not really worth the paper on which it has been written; the Chinese intrusion of 2020/21 vindicates my contention.

Ladakh Standoff 2020/21

Now, comes the Ladakh Standoff off 2020/21.  Here, we are presented with the 1959 LAC; the one that was proposed by Zhou to Nehru on 7 Nov 1959.  Though, the Chinese referred to it during the Dolam Crisis of 2017; it really sank in after the Chinese occupied our ‘No Man’s Land’ in May 2020 and presented a fait-accompli to us.  Now the MEA, as usual, is bewildered, as I doubt if anyone would have heard of such a line? If they had, one could be reasonably sure that they did not know where it ran?  Negotiations start after the Galwan clash on 15 Jun 2020.  Twelve rounds of Military Commanders’ talks have taken place.  These are interspersed with Jai Shankar-Wang Yi meetings which have set guidance for capitulation by India.  The NSA is silent as he really does not know where these meetings are leading?  Those who have time, please read a series of articles on the Ladakh Standoff written by me. The recent one “Resolve the Impasse in Ladakh; Lest we lose Depsang” exactly tells what the Chinese are planning to do.

Now, let us see what we have achieved by two foolish decisions that we have taken? First; vacating the Kailash Range that was dominating the entire southern half of Eastern Ladakh Frontier. Second; delinking Depsang from the current disengagement by stating that it is an old problem and will be sorted out separately.  Whether the Demchok intrusion figures in the disengagement; we need to figure out? We have raised these issues with the Chinese but Depsang for sure has not been included as a friction point.  Will someone please tell me who is the author of these two decisions?

Indian troops occupied Kailash Range at the end of Aug 2020.  China was so worried; the 6th, 7^th, and 8th Military Commanders’ Meetings were held on 21 Sep, 13 Oct, and 06 Nov 2020. At the 9th Meeting on 24 Jan 2021, they had ensured that India agreed to vacate the Kailash Range in return they would vacate the Fingers in the Northern Bank of Pangong Tso. Interspersed between the Military Commanders’ Meetings they had quietly worked on our MEA starting with Jai Shankar- Wang Yi meeting on 11 Sep 2020; the 19th and 20th WMCC Meetings on 30 Sep 2020 and 19 Dec 2020 to ensure that Depsang was not included as one of the friction points for disengagement.   It was a fiasco for India; please read my article ‘Five Point Disagreement’.

All through 2020 and 2021, the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Ambassador to India were singing like a canary that India is solely responsible for the Ladakh Standoff.  I have written about it repeatedly; all that was required was to take imageries of Eastern Ladakh as of 20 April 2020 and 10 May 2020.  The difference between the two imageries would reveal unambiguously as to who initiated the aggression?  It should be shown to the Chinese Ambassador, Wang Yi, and to the whole world.  All ambassadors in Delhi should have been called and briefed on the two imageries to expose China.  Let alone calling China’s bluff we have not named him as an aggressor.  During the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2020, when Mike Pompeo was talking of China’s aggression in the Himalayas, the Indian foreign minister instead of naming and calling out China for its aggression was speaking in innuendoes as if nothing has happened in Ladakh.

The Ladakh standoff has been a tremendous success from the Military point of view.  China perhaps never thought that we will be able to mirror its deployment and pose a challenge.  It is trying to get success from the impasse created as their plans have gone awry. We have helped out the Chinese by vacating Kailash range and delinking Depsang from the current disengagement.

Now, just look at our present pathetic state; with no card in our hands, we are left to plead with the Chinese for scheduling Military Commanders’ Meetings.  At each meeting, we are pleading with the Chinese for disengagement and the Chinese are agreeing incrementally to gain time and bring permanency to their present hold on Depsang.  Just note, how the Chinese are interspersing the MEA Meetings before the Military Commanders’ Meetings. Before the 11th Military Commanders’ Meeting on 9 Apr 2021, the two foreign ministers had a telephonic conversation and a WMCC Meeting took place on 12 Mar 2021.  Before the 12th Military Commanders’ Meeting on 31 Jul 2021, a WMCC Meeting was held on 25 Jun 2021 and the two foreign ministers met on 14 July 2021.

In the aftermath of the 12th Military Meeting, troops from both sides at PP 17A (Goggra Post) have completed disengagement and a ‘no patrol zone’ has been announced.  Hereafter, we have no other option but to continuously importunate China to have the 13th Military Commanders’ Meeting to disengage from Hot Spring (PP15).  By the time they would have held on to Depsang Plains for nearly two years.  By not allowing us to patrol beyond PP 9 in Depsang, he has ensured that he has technically occupied an area of about 900 sq km.  We should not let China get away with its perfidy.

Again, I fail to understand why we have to plead with the Chinese for disengagement?  During meetings, it is the Chinese who are calling the shots as our MEA is requesting time and again for disengagement ultimately leading to de-escalation: We should leave it to the Chinese to ask for disengagement; why are we in a hurry? We should prepare for war and keep our powder dry.  We should continue with our deployment in Ladakh and pose an equal threat to the Chinese. We should insist and enforce our patrolling rights in Depsang; if need be, by force.   We have to push our patrols beyond PP 9 to PPs 10, 11, 12, and 13 in Depsang.

Conclusion

We should not allow the Depsang issue to be swept under the carpet.  After showing tremendous political resolve; why are we not pushing our national interest?  It is simple; China wants to gain time and present us a fait accompli at Depsang; thereby permanently holding it.   If not for the political will of the Government and tough negotiations by our Generals, the MEA would have capitulated to the Chinese long before. Minister for External Affairs and NSA; are you listening? If we do not act now; history will not pardon you both.

What has been the ultimate outcome of the Ladakh Standoff?  On the minus side:

.         We have vacated from strategic heights of Kailash Range.  We have lost the only bargaining chip to call our shots.

·        We have lost our patrolling rights up to Finger 8, North of Pangong Tso, Depsang Plains, and at Gogra Post after the latest disengagement.

·        The denial of Patrolling in Depsang Plains has enabled China to technically seize over 900 sq km of our territory.  Time is not on our side as the hold of Chinese on Depsang could become a permanent affair.  China is not willing to discuss the issue with us.

·        The intrusion at Demchok and its solution look hazy.  Is China amenable to discuss it?

·        We have not been able to bring diplomatic pressure on China and are still charry to name it. This has made it very convenient for China to blame India for being the primary cause of the Ladakh Standoff.  We have not been able to counter the narrative.  Whatever diplomatic support we have got against China is more due to its own intrinsic hostility, arrogant behaviour fanned by its wolf warriors, predatory economics, and disruption of international sea routes by the illegal occupation of the South China Sea.

·        It has exposed our MEA and NSC for their inability to negotiate with the Chinese.  They have thrown all their aces and trump cards and are forced to depend on Chinese benevolence and their sense of goodwill to agree to each round of discussion and pick up whatever crumbs are thrown at us.

What has been on the plus side of the Standoff?

·        For the second time in history, our Political Leadership has displayed its political will against China to pursue our national interest; at Dolam in 2017 and now at Ladakh.

·        The ability of the Indian Armed Forces to mirror the Chinese deployment and pose a challenge to China, in spite of our terrain disadvantages is commendable.

·        The Generals for the first time have come on the scene and have proved their worth in tough negotiations with their Chinese counterparts.  Of course, in a democracy, they would abide by the decision of the CCS.

While it is not my aim to broad brush all the diplomats as blunderbusses; no doubt a majority of them need to learn and understand the geo-strategic and geo-political interests of our nation and methods to pursue them in host nations.  They need to work on a specific agenda and not work on generalities.  Diplomats in a region have to work collectively in different countries with a common goal to get the whole region to work in consonance with our national interest.  It has to follow a well-laid-out plan with long, medium, and short-term goals. This has to be done by our MEA where these goals have to be identified and disseminated based on our National Security Strategy which unfortunately has not yet been framed.  Believe me; we have carried on for the past seven decades and counting, without knowing where we are heading?

Disclaimer :- Views expressed in this article is entirely that of the author and does not represent the views of IIRF in any way.