Imbalance in Politico-Military Affairs
The First World War, within four months of its ill-conceived purpose, bungled to a bloody horrific grind on the Western Front. The Allies and their colonial armies had by that time suffered a million casualties. Britain’s 40-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, believed he had the solution to the noxious massacre in the trenches. He fancied himself a military strategist, abandoning his earlier capricious plan to invade Germany from the Baltic Sea, he now championed opening a second front against Turkey, seize Istanbul and gain control of the Straits linking the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and Russia, thus, knocking the Ottoman out of the war which in turn would persuade all Balkan states to join the Allies. This fanciful chain of desired events was neither backed by any serious analysis nor did it enjoy the luxury of overwhelming superiority in theatre. Even an understanding of the operational realities of an amphibious assault of the magnitude envisaged, was lacking. As for strategic assumptions made, there were none and therefore review of operations and possible alternative courses of action were non-existent. The ensuing campaign was driven more by hopes and revulsion at the carnage on the Western Front.
The ill-fated Dardanelles-Campaign began on 19 February 1915. In the event not only was a bulk of the British and French fleet lost in the action but over 65,000 troops were slaughtered in the Campaign and the Allies routed in a grisly bloodbath. Our ‘Strategist’ was guilty of grossly overestimating the capabilities of his own force and underestimating the complexity of amphibious operations. He, fatally, derided the motivation of the Turks defending their homeland. Churchill was sacked for incompetence.
Grand Theory and the Operational Art
War, as Clausewitz postulated, was the use of military force to achieve political aims. However, modern militaries during the process of developing military plans in support of policy are loathe to take risks that do not hold high the probability of success. This in turn leads to a skewed situation when unachievable policy aims are set out. And here lies the intrinsic antagonism that exists in politico-military affairs; when a military solution is a product of compromises, the outcome leaves political objectives sorely wanting. Quite obviously, when both polity and military leadership are combined in one authority, the blend makes for disastrous consequences.
Waging war requires institutions that can address problems that lie along the politico-military interface. Politicians need to listen to the military and take heed that the “sweep of an arm in a scything arc across the width of a small scale chart (map) spanning mountains, rivers and seas with little insight of own and enemy capabilities; the elements; force readiness; morale, logistics or indeed outcomes – does not a strategic offensive make”. This stark statement is a reminder of the disastrous gap between grand theory and the operational art. Instances abound in history when a politician steered-approach led to strategic blunders; conduct of World War II by Hitler, America in Vietnam, the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan are recent examples of wars when politico-military balance had gone awry. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 is of particular significance for not only were political policies with external-security ramifications made without military involvement, but leadership surrounded itself with pliable and incompetent defence advisors. So-much-so that when the crunch came, the Army was routed; the Navy remained within its havens; while the Air Force contemplated torching its forward deployed fighter aircrafts.
In the run-up to war, civilian leadership must not only have superior authority but also the sagacity to entertain alternate ideas that provide decision-avenues short of armed conflagration. And if the recourse to arms is advanced then it must never be terminal. After all War is a political tool and not an end; its effectiveness must be judged in a politico-diplomatic-strategic context.
Enter the Mercenary
Limited armed interventions, since the Second World War, have often demanded deployment of light forces over short duration with a feature of dubiety in identity of aggressor. In such circumstances mercenaries have been hired and deployed for circumscribed tasks under ‘hard- hold’. They conduct military operations in foreign conflict zones to bring about a desired outcome. If the employer state fails to achieve the desired end, then…the event is denied. These delinquent methods, in this day and age, are not only internationally condemnable but also run the risk of starting an unintended and uncontrolled war.
There is no expert consensus on who exactly is a “mercenary.” Those in the industry, their clients, and some outside experts spurn the “M” word owing to the associated stigma, and give these private-sector fighters new labels: private military contractors, military service providers and even operational contractors. Since the re-emergence of this new ‘sham warrior’ class in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the African continent one is at a loss to explain their purpose and efficacy in war, irrespective of the opposition or the perceived outcome.
The deployment of a mixture of conscription and mercenary services in the Russian military dates back to at least the 18th century (Parit, Makers of Modern Strategy, p 356) with a view to ‘stiffen-the-spine’ of a poorly motivated serf army. However, by the 20th century the idea of brutal press-ganged armies backed by a core of mercenaries gave way to professional and career oriented armies from the citizenry. The national military was subject to international accountability.
The Curious Case of the Wagner Group
The “Wagner Group” must be seen as a new phenomenon, primarily because their control or lack of it defies any formal structure, their mass is that of a regular army (reportedly, 50,000 strong) but allegiance questionable. Clearly the Wagner is more on the lines of a “have-army-will-travel”. The Group, a private Russian military company set-up in 2014 on terms that remain unknown, is led by its co-founder Mr Yevgeny Prigozhin a businessman, reportedly with connections and ambitions. Till recently tasked with fighting Kremlin’s land-war in the Donbas theatre of East Ukraine the Group had indefinite yet conditional access to the Russian military infrastructure. Enigmatic in concept and cloaked in a purpose that remains nebulous; it’s Command and Control structure remains utterly confused. What is clear is that relations between the Russian military and the Wagner is a tenuous one with exclusive control emanating from the highest political circle in the Kremlin (this inference comes in the wake of the manner in which their mutiny ended in a fizzle).
Despite its ambiguous existence, the Group has operated around the globe, from Syria to the Central African Republic; Nigeria and in West Asia in furtherance of Russia’s foreign policy and commercial objectives. Its commission includes clandestine armed missions and subversion; toppling ‘irksome’ regimes and security to private business interests. The group maintains close ties to the country’s intelligence services and it is probable that they work in tandem with the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshni Razvedkii) the Russian external spy agency. As for its legal status it obviously was created with the intrinsic capability to operate on the fringes of the constraints of the International Law of War.
The mutinous failure of the Group in eastern Ukraine, in particular in the Bakhmut sector, must have caused a total re-think of the employment of such an ill-disciplined army when pitted against a well-trained and motivated Ukrainian force. Most abidingly ludicrous was the rebellious media image of Mr Prigozhin, fully outfitted in an undersized combat helmet, bulging out of the seams of his bullet proof jacket fulminating over the lack of equipment and logistics that the Russian State had promised him to wage the land war. It spoke volumes of the motivation of a mercenary militia to fight.
Military Judgement and Leadership
Constitutional authority of the Supreme Commander will always be vested in civilian hands (in democracies), it is a matter of how this authority is made too pervasive and often assumed by agents below in the political hierarchy. Such armchair strategists are shielded from the professional simply because the latter is officially prohibited from entering into a public debate; leaving military leadership often saddled with half-baked strategic decisions, driven by “hopes, fears and ambitions” rather than by experience and seasoned judgement.
Prerogatives and duties of a political office in charge of the military must not enter the domain of “military judgement” where knowledge and motivations are at play; both assuredly a product of experience. Political savvy must essentially discern the line between strategic direction and the extent to which military means can aid in achieving that purpose. While, of the military leader, it is objectivity that is demanded; whether in pursuit of a strategic goal, attaining a desired posture, or indeed in weapons and platform selection. Military leadership first studies the nature of the threatening armed conflict and then seeks to rationalise an operational strategy that optimises means with effectiveness across the spectrum of warfare.
Chilling Trend of our Times
Modern strategic thought has no logic or grammar that gives description to private wars. The mercenary fights for any state or nation without regard to political interests, cause or even outcome…as long as the wages are good. The return of the mercenary and his access to the highest bidder; be he a politician, oligarch or a multinational corporation is one of the most dangerous and unpredictable trends of our times. Today, when the Mantri is engulfed by arm-chair strategists and ‘think-tanks’ preaching the need for interventions that invite low intensity “less-than-military” operations, the implications of a market for armed forces in global affairs is most perilous. For in an unregulated situation, the means of waging war being extended to entities that can afford-it, spells anarchy to global order.
Epilogue : The Russian Mercenary Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin was reportedly killed in a mid air crash on 23 August 2023. Prigozhin had led a brief armed mutiny against the Russian State earlier this year. The plane, a private “Embraer Legacy 600” crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 people on board.
