Defence agreements are traditionally struck between a major power and one or more smaller powers, or when a group of nations brings together the collective military might through a structure like NATO. There is always a big power as the anchor, without which such agreements carry little weight. Viewed in this light, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement seems symbolic rather than one of strategic military value.

Any alliance in West Asia must factor in the US military bases across Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. These bases, with over 40,000 US troops, support air and naval operations, logistics and intelligence gathering. Saudi Arabia’s and the region’s security dependency on the US is significant.

The reliability of this dependency has, however, been repeatedly tested in recent years and the geopolitical realities of US security guarantees are beginning to look doubtful. The 2019 drone strikes by Iranian proxies on Saudi Arabian oil facilities attracted only a muted US response. Six years later, Trump’s pledge to “protect” Qatar, after it committed billions of dollars of investment in the US, proved of little use. Within months of this assurance came the first-ever direct Iranian strike and the first-ever Israeli strike on a Gulf state. Iran struck the US Al-Udeid air base in Qatar on June 23, followed by Israel’s strike on Hamas in the heart of Qatar on September 9.

These events have shaken West Asia’s confidence in existing security guarantees and caused immense embarrassment. US military bases are becoming more of a liability than an asset. Adding to the discomfort is the absence of any global condemnation, China maintaining a safe distance, Europe missing in action and Russia busy mopping up Ukraine.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the only military threat it faces is from India. Consider a scenario where, in retaliation for another Pakistan-sponsored terror attack, India launches Operation Sindoor-2. Would Saudi Arabia abandon its economic and diplomatic relations with India and become a direct party to an India-Pakistan war that Pakistan itself may have triggered? Would it risk destroying the diplomatic linkages and the image of a responsible global player that it has carefully built over decades, for little in return? Saudi Arabia’s military capacity and track record also make such a scenario highly improbable.

Even with the newly minted defence agreement in place, Saudi Arabian assistance to Pakistan in a war with India is unlikely to extend beyond some additional oil supplies, financial aid and mediatory diplomacy.

Decision dilemmas of this kind may explain why the full text of the agreement has not been released. It is possible that while the signing ceremony was rushed through for optics, the complexities of the body text are still being worked out. It would also be important to see how the agreement addresses aggression that may be precipitated by one of the signatories themselves.

The agreement reportedly includes defence industry collaboration, technology transfer and co-production. These aspects could bring access to funds and useful outcomes for Pakistan’s defence industries. This may be the only tangible benefit for Pakistan, apart from the image makeover.

In the Saudi Arabia-Israel context, it is unlikely that Riyadh perceives a direct threat from Israel, even in the form of a Doha-type strike. Nor is there any realistic scenario in which Saudi Arabia perceives a nuclear threat to itself. Its greater dilemma lies in reconciling its earlier overtures to Israel and its assertion that Palestine was not a priority. It must now balance this to maintain credibility as the Islamic world’s leader. Outwardly, the agreement provides good optics for Saudi Arabia, showing strategic autonomy and signalling displeasure with the US and Israel. It also conveys a subtle message of potential access to nuclear weapons if ever needed, especially given Saudi Arabia’s past financial role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Yet speculation about a Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Saudi Arabia is unrealistic, given that Pakistan possesses only a minimalist first-strike nuclear capability.

Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, combined with active non-state actors operating from their territories, have made Saudi Arabia’s neighbourhood chaotic. These entities pose significant threats to its security. Problems could also arise from the mass Gaza exodus. One cannot rule out the emergence of trouble spots in and around Saudi Arabia, similar to Turkey’s Kurdish regions. Pakistan may be willing to assist Saudi Arabia in countering such challenges along its borders.

The only scenario in which the agreement looks militarily relevant is the Saudi Arabia-Iran context. The deal delivers a diplomatic and tactical blow to Tehran, Saudi Arabia’s main adversary. For Pakistan, however, it creates difficulties by deepening mistrust with its neighbour Iran.

This raises a question: is the agreement an American-engineered ploy with an eye on Iran?

Beyond the military sphere, Pakistan’s economy is a mess. Even maintaining its armed forces is proving financially burdensome. The country urgently needs an economic lifeline. An “on-call Wagner group” arrangement for its army may be one way to generate revenue.

Given the military capabilities of the signatories and the impact on regional power dynamics, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence agreement appears more symbolic than strategic.

What is of greater importance is the writing on the wall: the existing security structure in the region has collapsed. The million-dollar question is what shape the new structure will take and how long it will take to emerge.

Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Mutual Defence Pact: Highlights

Core commitment

* Any aggression against either country would mean aggression against both

* Could extend to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities

* Formalises decades-long defence cooperation

Saudi motivations

* Response to regional security breakdown after Israeli strike in Doha

* Reduce reliance on the US, diversify alliances

* Views Iran and Israel as threats, uses Pakistan’s nuclear status as deterrence

* Ambition to chart independent security path

ADVANTAGE PAKISTAN

* Cementing historic ties with Saudi Arabia

* Securing Saudi commitment in case of an Indian attack

* Likely Saudi financial support for Pakistan army

* Bolstering geopolitical standing

The India angle

* Makes cross-border operations against Pak risky

* Pact embeds Pakistan in West Asian security architecture

* Potential risk of a broadened anti-India alliance

* Saudi Arabia, however, maintains strong bilateral ties with India

* Pact reflects West Asian regional dynamics, not Indo-Pak conflict

Disclaimer and acknowledgement :- Views expressed are author’s own and does not represent the views of IIRF . This article was first published in The Week Magzine. This is an author’s authorised reprint.