India’s nuclear weapons are no longer merely symbolic instruments of deterrence. For the first time in its history, India has reportedly placed a part of its nuclear arsenal in an active state of readiness, enabling rapid deployment against potential adversaries such as Pakistan and China, and if necessary, other hostile powers.
A recent report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has drawn global attention to India’s evolving nuclear posture. According to the report, India possesses approximately 190 nuclear warheads, of which at least 12 are believed to be fully operational and actively deployed. This marks a historic development in India’s strategic doctrine.
SIPRI is widely regarded as one of the world’s most credible and independent institutions for research on international security, military expenditure, arms transfers, and nuclear weapons. Supported by the Swedish government and other international organizations, including agencies associated with the United Nations, SIPRI’s assessments carry considerable weight. Since nuclear-armed states rarely disclose the exact status of their operational readiness, external assessments such as those by SIPRI provide valuable insights into strategic realities.
Key Strategic Takeaways
Several important conclusions emerge from the report:
- India’s military strategy appears to be moving toward a doctrine of “Offensive Defence.”
- A debate has intensified within India regarding the future of its “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear policy.
- Nuclear readiness is becoming increasingly integrated with India’s broader national security strategy.
- India has achieved a credible Second Strike Capability through its sea-based nuclear deterrent, particularly via the Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
These developments suggest a maturing nuclear posture designed not merely for deterrence but also for ensuring survivability and retaliation under all circumstances.
India’s Shift Toward an Offensive Defence Strategy
In earlier assessments, India’s nuclear weapons were largely categorized as stockpiled assets rather than actively deployed systems. The distinction is strategically important.
Warheads kept in storage require additional time for mating with delivery systems and operational deployment. In contrast, active deployment significantly reduces response times and enhances the credibility of deterrence.
According to SIPRI, some Indian nuclear weapons are now deployed aboard warships, submarines, and missile systems on a continuing basis. This means that if an adversary attempts a nuclear strike against India, the country would be capable of launching a swift and devastating retaliatory strike.
Many strategic thinkers have long argued that India should adopt such a posture. Their reasoning was simple: deterrence works best when an adversary knows that retaliation will be immediate, certain, and overwhelming.
The logic behind this doctrine is that hostile states, particularly Pakistan, can only be deterred if they believe that any aggression will invite an equally severe response. Diplomatic relationships with major powers alone cannot guarantee security; military preparedness remains indispensable.
Major nuclear powers such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China have maintained substantial portions of their arsenals in active readiness for decades. India’s latest posture indicates a gradual alignment with established nuclear practices among major powers.
China’s Expanding Nuclear Arsenal and India’s Response
China remains India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge.
According to SIPRI, China currently maintains around 34 actively deployed nuclear warheads, nearly three times India’s reported operational deployment. More importantly, Beijing continues to expand both the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal.
China has increased its total nuclear stockpile from approximately 500 warheads to around 620 warheads in just three years. During the same period, India increased its arsenal from about 164 warheads to 190 warheads, representing a significant growth of nearly 15 percent.
China is also constructing missile infrastructure closer to India’s borders. One notable example is the missile base at Golmud in Qinghai Province, located roughly 900 kilometers from India. From such facilities, China can deploy nuclear-capable DF-26 ballistic missiles with ranges of approximately 4,000 kilometers, capable of striking deep inside Indian territory.
In the event of a surprise attack, India’s enhanced readiness allows for a quicker and more credible response. This appears to be one of the primary motivations behind the country’s evolving nuclear posture.
The Importance of Second Strike Capability
A central principle of nuclear deterrence is the ability to survive an enemy’s first strike and retaliate with devastating force. This is known as Second Strike Capability.
India has made considerable progress in this area through its sea-based nuclear deterrent. The indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines INS Arihant and INS Aridhaman provide India with a survivable platform capable of launching nuclear retaliation even if land-based assets are destroyed.
This capability fundamentally changes the strategic equation. Even if an adversary succeeds in damaging a substantial portion of India’s nuclear infrastructure, enough weapons would remain operational to inflict unacceptable damage in return.
The objective of nuclear deterrence is not necessarily to possess the largest arsenal. Rather, it is to convince potential adversaries that any nuclear attack will result in catastrophic consequences. Once this belief is firmly established, deterrence becomes effective.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Challenge
Pakistan continues to present a unique nuclear challenge for India.
For decades, Pakistani leaders and military officials have periodically invoked the possibility of nuclear escalation during periods of tension with India. Such rhetoric has been a consistent feature of Pakistan’s strategic communication.
Consequently, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent remains essential for India’s security.
Another important factor is the operational nature of India’s sea-based deterrent. On nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines such as INS Arihant and INS Aridhaman, nuclear warheads and delivery systems cannot always be maintained in completely separate states due to operational requirements. This reality naturally contributes to a higher level of readiness.
The lessons emerging from recent regional crises, including Operation Sindoor in 2025, have reinforced the importance of maintaining credible and survivable deterrent capabilities.
The Emerging Turkish Factor
India’s strategic planners are also paying increasing attention to Turkey.
In recent years, Turkey has emerged as one of Pakistan’s most vocal international supporters. This trend became particularly visible during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when Pakistan reportedly employed Turkish-origin drones against India.
Although Turkey is geographically distant from India, it falls within the operational range of India’s Agni-IV and Agni-V ballistic missiles. Consequently, Turkish military and technological support for Pakistan cannot be ignored from a long-term strategic perspective.
The growing military cooperation between Ankara and Islamabad adds another layer of complexity to India’s security calculations.
Should India Reconsider the No First Use Policy?
One of the most important strategic debates currently underway concerns India’s No First Use (NFU) doctrine.
Under the existing policy, India pledges not to use nuclear weapons first but reserves the right to launch massive retaliation if attacked with nuclear weapons.
Critics argue that changing geopolitical realities may require greater flexibility.
Their concern is straightforward: if Indian leadership possesses credible intelligence that an adversary is preparing an imminent nuclear strike, the current doctrine would theoretically require India to absorb the attack before responding. Such an approach could result in catastrophic casualties and infrastructure losses.
Supporters of policy revision argue that India should retain the option of a pre-emptive strike under exceptional circumstances. They contend that democratic governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens and should not be constrained by an overly rigid doctrine.
Manohar Parrikar’s Perspective
The debate gained prominence when former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar publicly questioned the rigidity of the NFU doctrine in 2016.
Parrikar argued that India should emphasize responsible nuclear stewardship rather than binding itself to an absolute commitment. In his view, India could simply declare itself a responsible nuclear power that would never use nuclear weapons irresponsibly.
His remarks did not represent official policy, but they sparked an important strategic discussion that continues today.
Rising Global Nuclear Expenditure
The global nuclear arms race is also accelerating.
According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), global spending on nuclear weapons reached a record level in 2025.
Worldwide expenditure on nuclear weapons totalled approximately $119 billion. The United States accounted for $69.2 billion, China spent around $13.5 billion, and India spent approximately $2.8 billion (around ₹26,700 crore).
Although India’s spending remains significantly lower than that of the major nuclear powers, the increase reflects the priority being accorded to strategic modernization and deterrence capabilities.
The investment underscores India’s determination to maintain a credible and technologically advanced nuclear force amid a rapidly evolving security environment.
Geopolitical Challenges and India’s Strategic Path
India’s security environment is becoming increasingly complex.
The growing strategic cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan, Nepal’s expanding engagement with China, and Pakistan’s ambitious space program supported by Chinese technology all present long-term challenges.
At the global level, the emerging China-Russia partnership is challenging American influence, while the United States is strengthening cooperation with India through frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to balance China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.
In this environment, India’s strategic planners appear to be guided by a timeless principle: preparedness is the most effective guarantee of peace.
Conclusion
The latest SIPRI assessment indicates that India is entering a new phase in its nuclear evolution. The transition from a largely stockpiled deterrent to a partially active and operational nuclear posture reflects changing regional realities, particularly the rise of China’s nuclear capabilities and Pakistan’s continued reliance on nuclear signalling.
India’s strengthening second-strike capability, expanding nuclear arsenal, and growing emphasis on readiness are all aimed at ensuring that no adversary can contemplate a nuclear attack without facing unacceptable consequences.
As geopolitical competition intensifies across Asia, India’s challenge will be to maintain a delicate balance: preserving credible deterrence while remaining a responsible nuclear power committed to strategic stability and peace.
